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CRIMINOLOGY
THE INFLUENCE OF THE GARNER
DECISION ON POLICE USE OF
DEADLY FORCE
DR. ABRAHAM N. TENNENBAUM
ABSTRACT
In March of 1985, the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner held
that laws authorizing police use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing,
unarmed, non-violent felony suspects violate the Fourth Amendment,
and therefore states should eliminate them.
This paper investigates the impact of that decision on the
number of homicides committed by police officers nationwide. The
investigation shows a significant reduction (approximately sixteen
percent) between the number of homicides committed before, and
after the decision. This reduction was more significant in states which
declared their laws regarding police use of deadly force to be uncon-
stitutional after the Garner decision.
Evidence suggests that the reduction is due not only to a reduc-
tion in shooting fleeing felons, but also to a general reduction in po-
lice shooting. This paper discusses a mechanism that can explain the
unique Tennessee v. Garner dynamic.
I. INTRODUCTION
People have criticized use of deadly force ever since police of-
ficers began carrying guns. In 1858, a New York Times editorial about
a case in which a police officer shot and killed a fleeing suspect stated:
The pistols are not used in self-defence,-but to stop the men who are
running away. They are considered substitutes for swift feet and long
arms. Now, we doubt the propriety of employing them for such a pur-
pose. A Policeman has no right to shoot a man for running away from
him....
But what right have Policemen to carry revolvers at all? . . . We
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doubt very much the policy of arming our Policemen with revolvers.'
Similar arguments have persisted to the present day as the public
has consistently denounced civilian homicides by police officers. Peo-
ple have accused officers of shooting arbitrarily, or unjustifiably,2 and
most frequently of exhibiting racism in such situations.3 These accu-
sations have been supported by numerous empirical studies showing
that police officers kill African-Americans at a disproportionately
higher rate than whites.
4
In March of 1985, the United States Supreme Court, in Tennessee
v. Garner,5 held that laws authorizing police use of deadly force to ap-
prehend fleeing, unarmed, non-violent felony suspects violate the
Fourth Amendment, and therefore states should eliminate them.
This paper investigates the impact of the Garner decision on homi-
cides committed by police nationwide. However, before estimating
the influence of the decision, it is appropriate to describe the differ-
ent policies that existed prior to Garner, and the changes in the law
resulting from Garner.
A. POLICIES AND LEGAL SITUATION BEFORE GARNER
Prior to Garner, laws controlling police use of deadly force fell
into one of four groups: The Any-Felony Rule; The Defense-of-Life
Rule; The Model Penal Code; The Forcible Felony Rule.6 At one ex-
treme of the spectrum was the Any-Felony Rule. English common law
authorized officers to use any means necessary to arrest felony sus-
pects or prevent them from fleeing. In the United States, courts inter-
preted this rule as legal permission to shoot an unarmed felony
suspect in flight.
7
1 Police with Pistols, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1858, at 4.
2 An early study claims that from the incidents that were checked by the author, only
two-fifths were justifiable, one-fifth was questionable, and two-fifths were not justifiable.
Arthur L. Kobler, Police Homicide In A Democracy, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 163, 165 (1975).
3 See, e.g., Paul Takagi, A Garrison State In "Democratic" Society, 5 CIME & Soc. JusT. 27,
29-30 (1974).
4 Mark Blumberg, Police Use ofDeadly Force: Exploring Some Key Issues, in POLICE DEVIANCE
219, 229 (Thomas Barker & David L. Carter eds., 2d ed. 1991);JamesJ. Fyfe, Blind Justice:
Police Shootings in Memphis, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 707, 720 (1982); William A. Geller
& Michael S. Scott, Deadly Force: What We Know, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE: CONTEMPORARY
READING 453 (Carl B. Klockars & Stephen D. Mastrofske eds., 2d ed. 1991); David B. Gris-
wold & Charles R. Massey, Police and Citizen Killings of Ciminal Suspects: A Comparative Analy-
sis, 4 AM. J. POLICE 1, 6 (1985).
5 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
6 GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & LORIE A. FRIDELL, PoLICE VEHICLES AND FIREARMS: INSTRU-
MENTS OF DEADLY FORCE 70-71 (1992). See also Mark Blumberg, Controlling Police Use of
Deadly Force: Assessing Two Decades of Progress, in C~rITCAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY
READINGS 442, 442-43 (Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 1989).
7 See ALPERT & FRIDELL, supra note 6, at 70; Lawrence W. Sherman, Execution Without
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At the other end of the spectrum was the Defense-of-Life Rule.
Under this doctrine, the only justification for using deadly force was
to protect human life, either the police officer's own life or a civilian's
life.8 The only justification for risking loss of life was the preservation
of another life. Following this rationale, police shooting of an un-
armed fleeing suspect was unjustifiable, and unacceptable. Until re-
cently, this was the official policy of the FBI.9
The other two policies, the Model Penal Code (MPC) and the
Forcible-Felony Rule, tried to balance the two extremes. Ultimately,
however, they had the same practical result. The American Law Insti-
tute drafted the MPC to guide states that want to modify their criminal
statutes and procedures. 10 The Code offered two conditions to the
use of deadly force: (1) The crime involved the use or threatened.use
of deadly force; and (2) There is a substantial risk that the suspect will
cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed."
States enacting the Forcible-Felony Rule have defined specific
felonies as "forcible felonies." Those states allow police to use deadly
force only against people suspected of committing those felonies.
Usually, forcible felonies include murder, arson, rape, kidnapping,
and armed robbery. 12
Critics have directed most of their criticisms towards the Any-
Felony Rule, commenting that this rule is not adequate for modem
times.' 3 Indeed, when the English Common Law developed this rule,
the courts recognized only a few felonies, and the penalty for them
was capital punishment. Moreover, police did not have firearms, so
the permission to use "any means" meant actual physical force, or, at
most, perhaps a sword. Ultimately, England has eliminated the rule,
perhaps recognizing its inadequacy in today's world.
In the United States, many people have argued that the Any-Fel-
ony Rule is unconstitutional. They have claimed that it violates the
Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizure,
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
Taiak Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33 VAND. L. REV. 71, 74-79 (1980).
8 ALPERT & FRmE.L, supra note 6, at 71.
9 WInIA A. GELLER & MICHAEL S. ScoTr, DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE K.Now, A PRACTI-
TiomFR's DESK REFERENCE ON POLCE-INVOLVE SHOOTINGS 267-275 (1992) [hereinafter
DEADLY FORCE: PRACTITIONER'S DESK REFERENCE].
10 ALPERT & FRmELL, supra note 6, at 70.
11 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08(2) (b) (i),(iv) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
12 ALPERT & FRIDELL, supra note 6, at 71;J. Paul Boutwell, Use of Deadly Force to Arrest a
Fleeng Felon-A Constitutional Challenge, Parts I & 1f in READINGS ON POLICE USE OF DEADLY
FORCE 65, 73 (JamesJ. Fyfe ed., 1982).
13 Blumberg, supra note 6, at 443-44. Sherman, supra note 7, at 97.
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ment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.' 4
Despite long standing criticism, the Any-Felony Rule was the law
prior to Garner in at least twenty-four states, while some combination
of the other three policies existed in the other states. 15 However, po-
lice departments usually follow their internal guidelines rather than
the state's laws. Further, many of these guidelines are more restrictive
than the state law. Thus, the actual police departments' policies
before Garner varied significantly not only from state to state, but also
within each state. 16
B. TENNESSEE V GARNER
Most jurisdictions considered police use of deadly force for all
felonies to be legitimate until the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v.
Garner. In that case, Garner brought a wrongful death action under
the federal civil rights statute against a police officer and his respec-
tive department for the fatal shooting of Garner's son as he fled the
scene of a burglary. Garner's son was unarmed at the time of the
shooting. Justice White wrote for the majority, in a monumental deci-
sion: "We conclude that such force may not be used unless it is neces-
sary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others."'
7
Although scholars agree that Garner-type shootings are unconsti-
tutional,' 8 they disagree on what the phrase "the suspect poses a sig-
nificant threat of death or serious physical injury" means. Some
believe that the decision "created a constitutional right to run for
many felony suspects;"' 9 others argue that it gave police officers the
right to use deadly force only to protect life.2
0
14 See Boutwell, supra note 12; Floyd R Finch, Jr., Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Trig-
gering Constitutional Review, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 361 (1976); Sherman, supra note 7,
at 97.
15 While the Supreme Court lists 24 states where the 'Any Felony' rule was in existence
before Garner, others claim different numbers. Professors Fyfe and Walker show surprise at
that number, and claim some inaccuracy. James J. Fyfe &Jeffery T. Walker, Garner Plus
Five Years: An Examination of Supreme Court Intervention Into Police Discretion and Legislative
Prerogatives, 14 AM.J. CruM.JusT. 167, 177 (1990). This article uses the 22 states mentioned
by Professors Fyfe and Walker as the sample for the states influenced by Garner, and all the
rest as states that were not. See id at 177-78, table 1.
16 For the variety of policies, see GELLER & Scorr, supra note 9, at 247-75.
17 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
18 Ginny Looney, The Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force Against Nonviolent Fleeing Felons:
Garner v. Memphis Police Department, 18 GA. L. REv. 137, 163 (1983);John Simon, Ten-
nessee v. Garner: The Feeing Felon Rule 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1259, 1277 (1986).
19 Michael D. Greathouse, Criminal Law-The Right to Run: Deadly Force and the Fleeing
Felon: Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985), 11 S. ILL. U. LJ. 171, 184 (1986).
20 David B. Griswold, Controlling the Police Use of Deadly Force: Exploring the Alternatives, 4
[Vol. 85
USE OF DEADLY FORCE
It seems that the Supreme Court equivocated. It severely re-
stricted the Any-Felony Rule, but did not limit the use of deadly force
to self-defense. Its language is similar to the MPC, but demands less
by not requiring a life-threatening crime. As a result, most commenta-
tors agreed that the Court's decision in Garner would not significantly
affect police conduct,21 because the creation or modification of laws
has never effectively modified police behavior.
22
Professors Fyfe and Walker conducted a nationwide study which
examined the impact of the Garner decision on policy-makers. 23 They
examined legislative changes, activities of state attorneys general, and
subsequent federal case law, and found that of the twenty-two states
that Garner apparently affected, only four have amended their statutes
to comply with the Court's holding.24 In the remaining eighteen
states, only two state attorneys general have officially advised the po-
lice of the decision. Fyfe and Walker attribute this response to legisla-
tors' fear that complying with Garner would cause voters to view them
as being "soft on crime."25 However, their study did not deal with the
empirical question of whether Garner influenced the number of homi-
cides committed by police.
The primary focus of this article is to fill that void, and investigate
empirically the effect of the Garner decision on the number of homi-
cides police officers commit nationwide.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. DATA SET
Law enforcement agencies that report criminal homicides on the
basic Uniform Crime Report (UCR) form are requested (but not re-
quired) to submit a Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) for each
month.26 Agencies do not submit SHRs for months in which police
do not receive any reports of homicides. The form is incident-ori-
ented-i.e., if more than one murder occurred during the same inci-
dent, the agency fills out only one form, which covers each of the
homicides. Each form details the age and race of the offenders and
AM. J. PoUcE 93, 102 (1985).
21 See ALPERT & F&Eu.L, supra note 6, at 69; James J. Fyfe, Police Use of Deadly Force:
Research and Refomn, 5 JusT. Q. 165, 199 (1988).
22 JamesJ. Fyfe & Mark Blumberg, Response to Griswold: A More Valid Test ofthe Justfiabil-
ity of Police Actions, 4 AM.J. POLICE 110, 111 (1985). See also William B. Waegel, The Use of
Lethal Force By Police: The Effect of Statutoy Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 136 (1984).
23 Fyfe & Walker, supra note 15.
24 Id. at 178.
25 Id. at 179.




victims (if known), and the weapon used. The form also details the
circumstances and background of the incident, using terms such as
"love triangle," "killed by babysitter," "brawl under alcohol," "argu-
ment over money," "killed while robbery," "killed while rape," "justifi-
able homicide-civilian," and "justifiable homicide-police."
27
The data sources for this research are SHR files for the years 1976
through 1988, as processed by the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) from the original SHR master
tapes provided by the FBI.2 8 While the SHR has clear limitations, the
problems are not significant for the general question being tested,
29
and are similar to the problems in data sets used in previous research
about deadly force.3
0
B. THE STATISTICAL METHOD
The empirical analysis discussed in this article relies on "inter-
rupted time series analysis," which estimates the impact of a specific
event of social behavior. Analysts have used it to estimate the effect of
political changes on the stock market, to measure the effect of install-
ing a service fee on the number of phone calls to directory assistance,
and to test and measure the impact of experimental psychological
treatment. The most intensive use, however, has been to test the in-
fluence of new laws on changing public behavior.3'
Under this method, analysts measure the average number of ob-
27 Marc Riedel, Nationwide Homicide Data Sets: An Evaluation of the Uniform Crime Reports
and the National Center for Health Statistics Data, in MEASURING CRIME: LARGE-SCALE, LONG-
RANGE EFFORTS 175, 178 (Doris L. MacKenzie et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter MEASURING
CRIME].
28 Two states, Florida and Kentucky, were not included because of flawed data.
29 The validity of the UCR is a question beyond the scope of this paper. See generally
Yoshio Akiyama & Harvey M. Rosenthal, The Future of the Unform Crime Reporting Program:
Its Scope and Promise in MEASURING CRIME, supra note 27, at 49-74; Victoria W. Schneider &
Brian Wiersema, Limits and Use of the Uniform Crime Reports, in MEASURING CRIME, supra note
27, at 22-48; Paul H. Blackman & Richard E. Gardener, Flaws in the Current and Proposed
Uniform Crime Reporting Programs Regarding Homicide and Weapons Use in Violent
Crime (1986) (Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of Crimi-
nology). Concerning the SHR, Professor Maxfield points to some flaws in the data caused
largely by law enforcement agencies filling out the forms inappropriately. See Michael G.
Maxfield, Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINoL-
oGy 671, 685-92 (1989). The main problem in the "circumstances" variable seems to be
that the same circumstances can be interpreted in more than one way. See generally Colin
Loftin, The Validity of Robbery-Murder Classifications in Baltimore 1 VIOLENCE & VITIMS 191,
191-204 (1986).
30 On the general question of measuring homicides by police officers, see Lawrence W.
Sherman & Robert H. Langworthy, Measuring Homicide by Police Officers, 70 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1979). For a comprehensive review on the SHR measure of police
homicides, see DEADLY FORCE: PRAcrrrioNER's DESK REFERENCE, supra note 9, at 32-37.
31 DAVID MCDOWALL ET AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 10-11 (1980).
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servations in a time unit, before and after a specific event. If the event
influenced social behavior, these averages should be different. How-
ever, some trends which are not correlated to the tested event may
influence the time series' behavior. For example, some commenta-
tors have suggested that, even before Garner, the trend in justifiable
homicides by police was declining.3 2 Thus, any conclusion based only
on average differences may be incorrect.
One way to avoid this is to build a mathematical model which
takes into account trends and correlations in the data. After control-
ling for those, analysts may properly measure the averages and calcu-
late the influence of the event.
The most popular way to estimate the effect of a specific event for
this purpose is through the use of Auto Regressive Integrated Moving
Average (ARIMA) models.33 The advantage of ARIMA models (com-
pared with regression models) is that they are more sensitive to the
data, rather than the specific variables chosen by theory. One prob-
lem, however, is that the ARIMA models may not be sensitive enough
to find a correlation between two variables. If, however, researchers
do find a correlation, they can rely on it conservatively.
An accurate model using ARIMA requires researchers to first
identify the reasonable model, then estimate the parameters for that
model, and then conduct an appropriate diagnosis of the model.
3 4
Once an appropriate model is built, analysts may add the intervention
component and test its influence on the model.
Using an ARIMA model, the influence of Garner on the number
of homicides committed by police nationwide was tested.3 5 Also, Gar-
nets influence on various states was tested. The author divided the
data into two groups: states whose deadly force laws were declared
unconstitutional ("unconstitutional states"); and states whose laws
32 See generally LAW ENcE W. SHRmAN ET A., CITIZENS KILLED BY BIG CrIy POLICE 1970-
84 (1986).
33 For details on ARIMA, see GEORGE E.P. Box & GWILY M.JENKINs, TIME SERIES ANALY-
sIs: FORECASTING AND CONMOL 12, 73-78, 87-103 (1976). On the specific question of inter-
vention in time series, see Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., On Analyzing the Effects of Policy
Interventions: Box-Jenkins and Box-Tiao vs. Structural Equation Models, SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD-
OLOGy 137 (1977); Richard McCleary & David McDowall, A Time Series Approach to Causal
Modeling Swedish Population Growth, 1750-1849, 10 POLnCAL MEMODOLOGY 357 (1984);
RiCHARD McCIEARY Er AL., APPLIED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1980);
DAVID McDowALL ET AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS (1980).
34 SPSS INC., SPSS-X USER'S GUIDE 385 (3d ed. 1988). Technically, the author identi-
fies the model using the auto-correlation-function (ACF) and the partial-auto-correlation-
function (PACF). The parameters must lie within the bounds of stationarity-invertability,
and be statistically significant, to be considered adequate. Two tests are usually applied to
verify the estimated model; the residuals of the ACF must describe white noise (without
spikes in key lags), and the Q-statistic must be insignificant.
35 The study examined a total of 4733 cases from January 1976 to December 1988.
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were adequate before Garner ("constitutional states"). The study mea-
sured Garner's influence on each of these groups to determine
whether it was greater on one than on the other.
36
C. VERIFICATION TESTS
To avoid the possibility that a variable which is unrelated to Gar-
ner affected the results, the author first determined the total number
of homicides (including justifiable) committed by police during the
same time period. If the measurement process is accurate, the
number of total homicides before and after Garner should not differ.
Also, the author measured the influence of Garner on the ratio of po-
lice homicides to the total number of criminal homicides. If the data
were faulty, the ratio between them would be influenced to a lesser
extent than the individual categories.
37
These two validations are important because of the correlation
between the number of police homicides and the number of criminal
homicides. 38 If, despite this connection, the number of police homi-
cides decreased, while the number of criminal homicides remained
constant, the Garner decision most likely influenced that reduction.
III. FINDINGS
A. THE REDUCTION IN POLICE HOMICIDES
Graph 139 shows the incidence of police homicides over time.
The line in the middle is the intervention point (the month of the
Garner decision). As the graph indicates, the data does not contain an
outlier.
36 The study actually looks at the influence of Garner on police shooting in general and
not only at cases that resulted in death. However, the number of homicides is a direct
result of the number of shootings. According to the SHR, from the total of 4733 police
homicides used for this study, 4670 (98.67%) were the results of shooting.
37 See generally THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DE-
SIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979). For a short summary, see Thomas D.
Cook, Clarifying the Warrant for Generalized Causal Inferences in Quasi-Experimentation, in EvAL-
UATION AND EDUCATION: AT QUARTER CENTURY 115 (Milbrey W. McLaughlin & D.C. Phil-
lips eds., 1991).
38 See James J. Fyfe, Geographic Correlates of Police Shooting A Microanalysis, 17 J. RES.
CRIME AND DELINQ. 101 (1980); Richard R.E. Kania & Wade C. Mackey, Police Violence as a
Function of Community Characteristics, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1977). But see Robert H. Lang-
worthy, Police Shooting and Criminal Homicide: The Temporal Relationship, 2 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1986). For the connection between police homicides and violent crime
in general, see DavidJacobs & David Britt, Inequality and Police Use of Deadly Force: An Empiri-
cal Assessment of a Conflict Hypothesis, 26 SociAL FORCES 403, 412 (1979).
39 Looking at graphs alone is not an accurate way to reach conclusions, and can some-
times be misleading. It is recommended, however, to avoid outlying points. See generally
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As stated, analysts cannot add the intervention component until
they identify the right statistical model for the data. As Graph 2,
which shows the auto-correlation-function (ACF), and Graph 3, which
shows the partial-auto-correlation-function (PACF) of the original
data illustrate, the most appropriate model is the auto-regressive
model of order 1. Graph 4 shows the auto-correlation-function
(AGF), and Graph 5 shows the partial auto-correlation-function
(PACF) of this model.
The model passes the diagnostic stage because there are no sig-
nificant values in key lags in any graphs; the parameter estimates are
within the permitted boundaries; and the Q-test is not significant.
40
Thus, this model is appropriate to test the intervention-i.e., the ef-
fect of the Garner decision on police homicides.
Table 1 includes the parameters for the intervention model for
the number of police homicides each month ("police" variable), and
the ratio of police homicides to criminal homicides ("ratio" variable).
40 The Q-statistic is distributed as a chi-square statistic. At the 0.05 level, the critical
value (with 23 degrees of freedom) is 35.17. If the Q-test is more than the critical value (as
in Graph 2), the model does not fit the assumption about non-auto-correlation of the
residuals. If this is the case, the model is inappropriate.
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GRAPH 2
ACF VARIABLE IS POLICE.
MAXILAG IS 25. LBQ./
FIRST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = I
LAST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 156
NO. OF OBS. AFTER DIFFERENCING = 156
MEAN OF THE (DIFFERENCED) SERIES = 28.1026
STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN = 0.5430
T-VALUE OF MEAN (AGAINST ZERO) = 51.7513
AUTOCORRELATIONS
1-12 .35 .20 .27 .21 .10 .02 .22 .18 .14 .20 .20 .15
ST.E. .08 .09 .09 .10 .10 .10 .10 .10 .11 .11 .11 .11
L-B. Q 20. 27. 38. 46. 47. 47. 55. 60. 63. 70. 77. 80.
13-24 .06 0.0 -. 05 -. 01 0.0 -. 06 .02 .05 .02 -. 15 -. 13 0.0
ST.E. .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .11 .12





-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
LAG CORR. - ----- ----- ----- -----------------------------------
I
1 0.353 + IXXX+XXXXX
2 0.205 + IXXX+X
3 0.269 + IXXXX+XX
4 0.211 + IXXXXX
5 0.103 + IXXX +
6 0.025 + IX +
7 0.215 + IXXXXX
8 0.176 + IXXXX+
9 0.138 + IXXX +
10 0.197 + IXXXXX
11 0.198 + IXXXXX
12 0.148 + IXXXX+
13 0.058 + IX +
14 -0.001 + I +
15 -0.054 + XI +
16 -0.010 + I +
17 0.004 + I +
18 -0.059 + XI +
19 - 0.023 + IX +
20 0.045 + IX +
21 0.018 + I +
22 -0.155 +XXXXI +
23 -0.125 + XXXI +
24 0.000 + I +
25 -0.010 + I +
Show the ACF for the variable 'police' (police homicides), and the Qstatistic. As can be seen, the ACF
has significant value in all the first four lags, and the Q statistic is significant (Qdistribution here is like
chai-square distribution ivth twenty-five degrees of freedom).
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GRAPH 3
PACF VARIABLE IS POLICE.
MAXLAG IS 25./
FIRST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 1
LAST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 156
NO. OF OBS. AFTER DIFFERENCING = 156
MEAN OF THE (DIFFERENCED) SERIES = 28.1026
STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN = 0.5430
T-VALUE OF MEAN (AGAINST ZERO) = 51.7513
PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS
1-12 .35 .09 .20 .07 -. 03 -. 08 .21 .05 .07 .08 .04 0.0
ST.E. .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08
13-24 -. 05 -. 12 -. 11 ,03 .01 -. 08 .04 0.0 0.0 -. 19 -. 06 .09
ST.E. .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08
25-25 .15
ST.E. .08
PLOT OF PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
LAG CORR. +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
I
1 0.353 + IXXX+XXXXX
2 0.091 + IXX +
3 0.197 + IXXX+X
4 0.065 + IXX +
5 -0.029 + XI +
6 -0.078 + XXI +
7 0.208 + IXXX+X
8 0.053 + IX +
9 0.067 + IXX +
10 0.081 + IXX +
11 0.040 + IX +
12 0.001 + I +
13 -0.046 + XI +
14 -0.118 +XXXI +
15 -0.114 +XXXI +
16 0.028 + IX +
17 0.011 + I +
18 -0.079 + XXI +
19 0.036 + IX +
20 -0.002 + I +
21 -0.003 + I +
22 -0.188 X+XXXI +
23 -0.058 + XI +
24 0.093 + IXX +
25 0.149 + IXXXX
Shows the PACF for the variable 'police' (police homicides).
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GRAPH 4
ACF VARIABLE IS OUTR.
MAXLAG IS 25. LBQ./
FIRST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 2
LAST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 156
NO. OF OBS. AFTER DIFFERENCING = 155
MEAN OF THE (DIFFERENCED) SERIES = -0.0688
STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN = 0.5087
T-VALUE OF MEAN (AGAINST ZERO) = -0.1353
AUTOCORRELATIONS
1-12 -. 05 0.0 .19 .12 .03 -. 09 .19 .08 .02 .11 .11 .09
ST.E. .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09
L.-B. Q .30 .30 6.1 8.5 8.6 9.9 16. 17. 17. 19. 21. 22.
13-24 .02 0.0 -. 07 0.0 .04 -. 08 .03 .05 .08 -. 15 -. 10 .05
ST.E. .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09 .09





-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
LAG CORR.
I
1 -0.047 + XI +
2 0.002 + I +
3 0.190 + IXXX+X
4 0.121 + IXXX+
5 0.028 + IX +
6 -0.090 + XXI +
7 0.185 + IXXX+X
8 0.078 + IXX +
9 0.024 + IX +
10 0.114 + IXXX+
11 0.106 + IXXX+
12 0.095 + IXX +
13 0.020 + I +
14 -0.004 + I +
15 -0.068 + XXI +
16 0.003 + I +
17 0.042 + IX +
18 -0.084 + XXI +
19 0.026 + IX +
20 0.048 + IX +
21 0.077 + IXX +
22 -0.149 +XXXXI +
23 -0.095 + XXI +
24 0.054 + IX +
25 0.039 + IX +
Shows the ACF and the Q-statistic for the residuals of 'police' (police homicides) for the auto-
regressive first-order model.
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GRAPH 5
PACF VARIABLE IS OUTR.
MAXLAG IS 25./
FIRST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 2
LAST CASE NUMBER TO BE USED = 156
IPAGE 7 2T POLICE HOMICIDES
NO. OF OBS. AFMER DIFFERENCING = 155
MEAN OF THE (DIFFERENCED) SERIES = -0.0688
STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN = 0.5087
T-VALUE OF MEAN (AGAINST ZERO) = -0.1353
PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS
1-12 -. 05 0.0 .19 .14 .04 -. 13 .13 .08 .07 .09 .06 .06
ST.E. .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08
13-24 .01 -. 07 -. 15 -. 04 .04 -. 06 0.0 0.0 .08 -. 14 -. 14 -. 02
ST.E. .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08 .08
25-25 .16
ST.E. .08
PLOT OF PARTIAL AUTOCORRELATIONS
-1.0 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
LAG CORR. - ----- ----- ----- -----------------------------------
I
1 -0.047 + XI +
2 0.000 + I +
3 0.190 + IXXX+X
4 0.145 + lXXX
5 0.044 + IX +
6 -0.132 +XXXI +
7 0.126 + IXXX+
8 0.077 + IXX +
9 0.072 + IXX +
10 0.090 + IXX +
11 0.064 + IXX +
12 0.056 + IX +
13 0.014 + I +
14 -0.071 + XXI +
15 -0.154 XXXXI +
16 -0.044 + XI +
17 0.036 + IX +
18 -0.060 + XXI +
19 0.002 + I +
20 0.003 + I +
21 0.076 + IXX +
22 -0.137 +XXXI +
23 -0.145 XXXXI +
24 -0.025 + XI +
25 0.160 + IXXXX
Shows the PACF for the residuals of 'police' (police homicides) for the auto-regressive first-order
model.
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The estimate for the first order component relating to the police vari-
able is 0.2804 with a T-ratio of 3.60. The mean (before the interven-
tion) is 29.43 police homicides a month with a 35.8 T-ratio. The


































(of the mean) 35.88 34.57
Reduction: -16.13% -13.61%
Summarizes the results for the variables 'police' (number of police homicides)
and 'ratio' (the ratio between police homicides and criminal homicides).
Model type: is the ARIMA model which fitted the data.
Parameter: is the first order parameter.
Intervention: is the size of the intervention (reduction) component.
Mean: is the mean of the variable before the intervention point.
Reduction: is the size of the reduction in percentage.
Based on the first order component for the police variable, the
full equation is:
Ht = 29.43 + Ht-1*0.28 - 4.7*1 + At
where I is a dummy variable representing the time before and after
the intervention, and At is the random component.
These results indicate that police homicides decreased from
29.43 per month to 24.68 following the Court's decision in Garner
This is a monthly average of 4.75, a reduction of approximately six-
teen (16.15) percent.
Table 1 also includes the parameters for the "ratio" variable,
which represents the ratio between police homicides and criminal
homicides. The estimate for the first order component is 0.32, with a
T-ratio of 4.19. The mean of the ratio between police homicides and
criminal homicides is 1.91. The intervention component is -0.26, with
a T-ratio of -2.56. This means that after Garner, the percentage of po-
lice homicides that contributed to the total number of homicides fell
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by approximately 0.26%. As before, the full equation is:
Ratio t = 1.91 + Ratiot-1*0.32 - 0.26*1 + At
The total reduction of the "ratio" variable between police homi-
cides and criminal homicides decreased by 13.55% following the Gar-
ner decision.
The difference between the police homicide reduction (16.15%)
and the ratio reduction (13.55%) is due to variation in the criminal
homicides number and not in the police homicides number. As Ta-
ble 1 illustrates, the mean of police homicides in the first-third of the
third period (29.54) is almost the same as in the second-third (29.88),
while the ratio mean went down from 1.95 in the first-third to 1.90 in
the second-third. In both cases, however, the big reduction occurred
in the third-third (each third represents 52 months out of the sample
of 156. The intervention point is seven months after the beginning of
the third-third).
B. "CONSTITUTIONAL" AND "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATES
Table 2 summarizes three intervention variables in addition to
the "police" and "ratio" variables.
The first variable is the total number of criminal homicides ("to-
tal" variable). The results in Table 2 show that the T-ratio of the inter-
vention is -0.72, so even the small reduction of 2.9% is not valid. This
suggests that there was no significant intervention in the total homi-
cides as reported in the Supplementary Homicide Report, and there-
fore, the results of this study are not an outcome of measurement
variability.
TABLE 2.
Size of intervention T-ratio of Mean before Reduction in
component intervention component intervention precent
Total: -46.28 -0.72 1576 -2.9%
State -2.16 -3.66 9.072 -23.80%
Notstate: -2.64 -2.47 20.37 -12.96%
Summarizes the results of the intervention for five other variables:
'Total'-the number of criminal homicides. 'State'-the number of police
homicides in states whose laws were influenced by the Garner decision. 'Notstate'-
the number of police homicides in states whose laws were not influenced by the
Garner decision. Size of intervention component indicates the number of homicides
reduced by the decision. A mean before intervention is the mean predicted by the
model in the assumption that the intervention made a difference.
Table 2 indicates that the Garner decision influenced both the
constitutional and unconstitutional states. In the unconstitutional
states (termed "State" in Table 2), the reduction was an average of
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2.16 homicides following the Garner decision; in constitutional states
(termed "Notstate"), the reduction was 2.64 homicides following Gar-
ner. Clearly, however, the decision in Gamer had a greater influence
on the unconstitutional states than the constitutional ones. Because
of the differences in the number of police homicides to start with, the
percentage reduction was different. In the constitutional states, the
number of homicides declined by approximately thirteen percent
(-12.96%). In the unconstitutional states the reduction was approxi-
mately twenty-four percent (23.80%).
C. SUB-CIRCUMSTANCES
Another variable in the data set is called sub-circumstances. Sub-
circumstance is defined only for the cases where the "circumstances"
variable value is 'justifiable homicide-police" or 'Justifiable homi-
cide-civilian." In cases of criminal homicide, it has a zero value.
This variable has seven values (the values are defined by the SHR it-
self, and this is how they appear in the code book):
1. Felon attacked police officer
2. Felon attacked fellow police officer
3. Felon attacked civilian
4. Felon attempted flight from a crime
5. Felon killed in commission of crime
6. Felon resisted arrest
7. Not enough information to determine
Unfortunately, the sample is too small to use ARIMA for each
category (or even a combination of categories). However, the mean
values in each category before and after the Gamer decision reveal as
indicated in Table 3, that the sub-category of shooting felons who at-
tacked police officers increased slightly from an average of 10.91 po-
lice homicides per month before Garner to 11.489 per month after
Garner. Also, attempted flight went down from 2.135 to 1.044 per
month (a reduction of 51%), the number of felons killed in the com-
mission of a crime decreased by 29% (from 8.847 police homicides
per month to 6.267), and cases of resisting arrest went down from
3.874 cases a month to 2.644 (a reduction of approximately 32%).
This reduction has to be viewed cautiously for two reasons. First,
comparing averages alone is not generally a good measure for estimat-
ing impact.41 Second, it is not surprising that police officers tend to
report shootings differently when the norms have been changed. Pro-
fessor Fyfe reported that after a new New York City Police Department
policy banned warning shots, the number of police shootings re-
41 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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TABTE 3.
Code Description Total-Before Mean-Before Total-After Mean-After
1 Felon attacked police 1211 10.910 517 11.489
officer
2 Felon attacked fellow 211 1.901 41 .911
police officer
3 Felon attacked a civilian 69 .622 36 .800
4 Felon attempted flight 237 2.135 47 1.044
from a crime
5 Felon killed in 982 8.847 282 6.267
commission of a crime
6 Felon resisted arrest 430 3.874 119 2.644
7 Not enough 417 3.760 134 2.978
information to
determine
SUM OF ALL 3557 32.050 1176 26.133
Table 3 shows the total and monthly means for each sub-circumstances category.
ported as "accidental" jumped from 4.5% to 9.2%.42 The Memphis
Police Department reported similar results. Professors Sparger and
Giacopassi reported that after a policy change, the number of shoot-
ings classified as "apprehend suspect" declined by 58.6% while the
rate of "defend life" increased 91.5%. 43 These changes in Memphis
occurred despite the fact that there was no reduction in the total
amount of police shootings.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. THE FACTS
Three conclusions seem to be self-evident from the data
presented here. The first, and most important one is that Garner had
a clear effect on justifiable police homicides. It reduced the total
number of police homicides by approximately sixty homicides a year
(more than sixteen percent). Second, Garner had an influence in
both unconstitutional states and constitutional states. The magnitude
of the reduction, however, was greater in unconstitutional states. Fi-
nally, Garner influenced not only a reduction in the number of police
shootings of fleeing felons, but of all shootings, even those that are
not correlated to defending life. This conclusion, however, needs
more empirical support before it can be unequivocally accepted.
42 James J. Fyfe, Administrative Interventions On Police Shooting Discretion: An Empirical Ex-
amination, 7J. QuM. JusT. 309, 318 (1979).
43 Jerry R. Sparger & David J. Giacopassi, Memphis Revisited: A Reexamination of Police
Shootings After the Garner Decision, 9 JUST. Q. 211, 218 (1992).
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B. WHY DID THE GARNER DECISION HAVE SUCH AN IMPACr?
The impact of Garner is surprising. Even before Garner, many po-
lice departments had already restricted their guidelines, and repealed
the Any-Felony Rule. Accordingly, observers did not expect Garner to
have such a dramatic impact.44
A recent study on the influence of the Garner decision on the
Memphis Police Department (MPD) may explain this phenomenon.
Sparger & Giacopassi investigated MPD shootings in three different
periods: 1969-1974; 1980-1984; 1985-1989. 45 They concluded that Gar-
ner definitely reduced police shootings.46 Even though Memphis' pol-
icy before Garner was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision,
the police restricted the policy even further after the decision. In fact,
the policy after Garner emphasized "that deadly force should be used
only as a last resort to protect life, not merely to apprehend fleeing
dangerous felons."
4 7
This tendency by police departments to restrict their shooting
guidelines beyond legal requirements is not a new one. Kenneth Ma-
tulia, who conducted a survey among fifty-seven big city police depart-
ments, wrote that "the individual police department rules . . .
generally place a more restrictive standard of conduct than permitted
by law."'48 Professors Geller and Scott also described a tendency in law
enforcement agencies to move towards guidelines which were more
restrictive than Garner required.
49
Thus, the adoption of more restricted policies by police depart-
ments nationwide after the Court's decision in Garner seems to have
caused the reduction in police homicides. This is consistent with the
evidence that restricted policies can reduce police shootings, and
therefore police homicides. 50 The magnitude of the change can ex-
plain the differences in reduction between the unconstitutional states
(23.8% reduction in police homicides), and the constitutional states
(12.96% reduction). The modifications which should have been
made in department policies were higher in states that had the Any-
Felony Rule than in states which did not. As a result, Garner's influ-
ence was more accentuated in the unconstitutional states.
44 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
45 See generally Sparger & Giacopassi, supra note 43.
46 Id. at 224.
47 Id. at 214.
48 KENNETH J. MATuLIA, A BALANCE OF FORCES: MODEL DEADLY FORCE POLICY AND PRO-
CEDURE 17 (2d ed. 1985).
49 DEADLY FORCE: A PRACTMONER's DESK REFERENCE, supra note 9, at 256.
50 Id. at 257-67; see also Gerald I. Uelmen, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy
Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1 (1973).
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The self-restrictions on police behavior concerning deadly force
were not only the result of good will but were also a political necessity.
Police shootings of civilians have huge social costs, including riots.5 '
This has happened not only in the United States but in other nations
too,52 and it is almost anticipated in some neighborhoods. Aside from
public disturbances, police use of deadly force often spawns civil law-
suits. 53 The fear of riots and law suits may explain why mayors and
police chiefs prefer to severely limit the instances in which their of-
ficers may use deadly force.
In sum, the Garner decision seems to have reduced police homi-
cides directly (by reducing police shooting at fleeing felons), and indi-
rectly (by influencing police departments to reduce and modify their
guidelines beyond Garner to appear just and sensitive to the public).
As a result, all police shooting unrelated to protecting life seems to be
declining.
C. SOME UNDESIRABLE OUTCOMES
Until the 1960s, the number of homicides in the United States
was relatively stable.54 There were fewer homicides then there are to-
day, and the percentage of homicides which qualified asjustifiable (by
police or civilians) was much higher than today. As Professor Brearley
wrote in 1932, "it may be safely concluded that justifiable homicides
comprise from one-fourth to one-third of the total number of
slayings." 5
These statistics suggest that the more society views police and ci-
vilian homicides as justifiable, the more criminals these homicides de-
ter. Professor Cloninger investigated the connection between police
homicides and the crime rate in fifty cities. 56 He found that non-
homicide violent crime rates are inversely related to the police's lethal
51 For a list of occasions where shooting or other incidence between police officers and
civilians caused rioting, see DEADLY FoRCE: A PRAasrmONER's DEsK REFERENCE, supra note 9,
at 1-14.
52 Any incident where a police officer causes some unnecessary harm to civilians can
cause riots. For example, on July 17, 1992, in Bristol, England, two local men died in a
collision with a police car after they had stolen a police motorcycle. Their death immedi-
ately caused three days of rioting and looting. Maurice Chittenden & Christopher Lloyd,
Police Say Infiltrators Organised Bristol Riots, THE TmEs (LoNDON),July 19, 1992, at 3.
53 See generally Michael M. Kaune & Chloe A. Tischler, Liability in Police Use of Deadly
Force 8 AM. J. PomCa 89 (1989).
54 Margaret A. Zahn, Homicide in the Twentieth Century: Trends, Types, and Causes, in Vio-
LENCE IN AMERCA 216, 222 (Ted R. Gurr ed., 1989).
55 H.C. BEARLEuY, HoMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (1932). See also, Zahn, supra note
54, at 221-22.
56 Dale 0. Cloninger, Lethal Police Response As A Crime Deterren 50 AM. J. ECON. & Soc.
59-69 (1991).
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response rate, and concluded that police use of deadly force has a
deterrent effect on the crime rate.
57
Further, police officers believe that the threat of deadly force de-
ters felony criminals, and that harsh statutory limitations on police
discretion is dangerous. 58 In fact, some officers have already com-
plained that the Garner decision, and resulting restrictive practices,
have made their work frustrating and more dangerous. 59
Arguably, Justice O'Connor recognized this concern in her dis-
senting opinion: "I cannot accept the majority's creation of a consti-
tutional right to flight for burglary suspects seeking to avoid capture at
the scene of the crime."60 The majority of the Court considered this
concern, but decided that the deterrent effect does notjustify the risk
of unnecessary police homicides. While the data is not sufficient to
answer the empirical questions, the possibility that the Court's deci-
sion in Garner eroded the deterrent effect of police homicide should
be considered in any evaluation of Garne's influence.
D. SUMMARY
Despite suspicion about the ability of the Supreme Court to
change police discretion,61 the Garner decision demonstrates that a
decision can have a strong effect on police behavior. However, more
research is needed on the local level to determine whether police de-
partments have changed their policies to comply with Garner. This
would provide a better understanding of the types of policies that can
influence police use of deadly force.
57 IL
58 A.L. Rodez, Deadly Force As a Deterrent to Felony Crimes Against Property: An Anal-
ysis of Michigan Police Officer Attitudes Toward Statutory Limitations On Their Use of
Discretion (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University); Abraham
N. Tennenbaum, Police Officers' Need For Self-Defense Causes Brutality, in POLICE BRuTALrTY
100-01 (Bruno Leone ed., 1991).
59 Gordon Witkin et al., Cops UnderFir, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REP., Dec. 3, 1990, at 32,
38.
60 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 32-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61 See generally GERaLD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLow HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABouT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
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